On May 25, 2008, the Mars Phoenix Lander (PHX) successfully landed in the northern planes of Mars in order to continue and complement NASA's "follow the water" theme as its predecessor Mars missions, such as Mars Odyssey (ODY) and Mars Exploration Rovers, have done in recent years. Instruments on the lander, through a robotic arm able to deliver soil samples to the deck, will perform in-situ and remote-sensing investigations to characterize the chemistry of materials at the local surface, subsurface, and atmosphere. Lander instruments will also identify the potential history of key indicator elements of significance to the biological potential of Mars, including potential organics within any accessible water ice. Precise trajectory control and targeting were necessary in order to achieve the accurate atmospheric entry conditions required for arriving at the desired landing site. The challenge for the trajectory control maneuver design was to meet or exceed these requirements in the presence of spacecraft limitations as well as other mission constraints. This paper describes the strategies used, including the specialized targeting specifically developed for PHX, in order to design and successfully execute the propulsive maneuvers that delivered the spacecraft to its targeted landing site while satisfying the planetary protection requirements in the presence of flight system constraints.
I. Introduction
On August 4, 2007, the Phoenix (PHX) Project launched a spacecraft from Space Launch Complex 17A at Cape Canaveral, Florida with the objective of delivering a stationary lander to a landing site in the northern planes of Mars. On May 25, 2008, after a tenmonth cruise and traversing over 682 Million kilometers in space, PHX successfully landed at a latitude of 68.22°N and longitude of 234.25° E, a location in the northern near-polar regions of Mars. This destination was chosen because Mars Odyssey -a NASA mission orbiting Mars since 2001 -had in 2002 discovered strong evidence suggesting the presence of water ice just below the surface in the arctic plains of Mars. The latitude band from 65°N to 72°N was considered desirable because it provided the proper mix of water ice and soil. Four regions (A through D, each 20° in longitude by 7° in latitude) within this band were initially considered as potential candidate landing regions ( Figure 1 ). Region B was the top priority until Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter (MRO), through its HIRISE imaging instrument with a 30 cm resolution, revealed that this area contained a high number of very large boulders and posed a high risk for landing safety. Consequently, in October of 2006, the final landing site within Region D was selected by the PHX landing site selection committee. This region provides larger expanses characterized with little surface variations but with interesting scientific discovery potential.
At the conclusion of the ten-month interplanetary cruise, the surface target was to be achieved via direct atmospheric entry, followed by a ballistic descent through the atmosphere -comprised of a hypersonic phase, a parachute phase, and a powered terminal descent phase -to the surface. Because the atmospheric descent was unguided, very precise cruise navigation delivery was needed in order to achieve the required accuracy at the entry aimpoint, defined at a Mars radius of 3522.2 km. The atmospheric entry target parameters are determined by iterating between the cruise trajectory target and the atmospheric flight profile until the entry state, when propagated through the atmosphere, achieves the desired landing site. Among the entry state parameters, two were of significance. These are, the entry flight path angle (FPA), which affects the ballistic trajectory of the Entry, Descent, and Landing (EDL) system through the atmosphere, and the entry epoch, which affects the EDL telecom relay synchronization with the Mars orbiters ODY and MRO. The delivery uncertainty in entry FPA and entry epoch, as well as uncertainties in the atmospheric flight, directly affect the size of the landing ellipse.
In addition to the pre-launch-predicted navigation challenges, the PHX mission provided a number of postlaunch challenges to the maneuver design and analysis element of the navigation. This paper describes how these challenges were met and in-flight solutions developed in order to achieve the desired delivery accuracy for a successful landing.
II. Spacecraft Configuration
The PHX flight system consisted of four major components: cruise stage, backshell, Lander structure (containing the payload), and the heatshield. Figure 25 shows an expanded view of the PHX flight system. The PHX flight system was almost entirely made up of existing Mars Surveyor Program 2001 (MSP'01) spacecraft hardware. The MSP'01 design was an adaptation of the Mars Polar Lander (MPL) spacecraft design. During flight, PHX, a three-axis stabilized spacecraft, maintained its nominal attitude profile with the use of four reaction control system (RCS) thrusters. The spacecraft mass at injection for the entire flight system (including propellant load) was 664 kg.
The cruise stage included solar panels, attitude control sensors (sun sensor, star tracker), two telecom antennas, a low gain antenna (LGA), and a medium gain antenna (MGA), and a two X-band transponders. Both antennas are oriented generally in the spacecraft -X direction. The MGA boresight was in the X-Z plane with an offset of about 32° from the -X-axis in order to maintain optimal telecom performance in the nominal cruise attitude during the late cruise phase. The cruise stage was jettisoned from the entry vehicle assembly approximately 5 minutes prior to entry.
During the interplanetary transfer to Mars, the Lander structure (containing the payload and the propulsion system) was enclosed by the back shell/heat shield assembly, which was also referred to as the aeroshell. The aeroshell protected the Lander from extreme heat loads experienced during atmospheric entry and descend, during which time, the incoming velocity was reduced from an atmosphere relative 19861 km/s to zero.
The heat shield reduced approximately 99% of the energy, while the parachute (released from the back shell) further slowed the Lander leading to the terminal descent. The terminal descent system, located on the Llander, controlled the Lander for soft touchdown onto the surface. The backshell also included a wrap-around UHF patch antenna for communications during EDL.
The Lander included the science instruments, solar arrays, batteries, and a UHF antenna for the relay link to the Mars orbiters. All of the electronics that performed spacecraft functions (including during interplanetary cruise) are contained on the Lander. Figure 36 shows the Lander as it might appear on the surface of Mars.
A. Telecommunications
The PHX telecommunications subsystem used X-band for direct-to-Earth (DTE) communications during the interplanetary cruise phase. Two different sets of X-band antennas, a Low Gain Antenna (LGA) and a Medium Gain Antenna (MGA) were required. The LGA was used for the first 157 days (from 0 to 0.5 AU Earth-range) and the MGA was used for the remainder of the cruise up to Mars atmospheric entry interface, except during TCMs, where the LGA was used.
A UHF system was used during EDL and continues to be used during the surface phases of the mission for relay communications through the Mars orbiters. The UHF equipment was in the Lander and was used with two different antenna sets, These were, a wrap-around patch UHF antenna on the backshell for communications during EDL, and a UHF antenna on the Lander for surface operations (will continue to be used through the end of the mission).
B. Attitude Control
The LGA boresight and the normal direction to the cruise stage solar arrays (SA) were both along the spacecraft -Xx-axis, while the MGA boresight pointed approximately 32° away from the -X-axis direction. During the inner cruise, the -X-axis was pointed in between the Earth and the Sun (about 50 to 60 degrees off the Sun), to accommodate both telecom and power requirements. However, the late cruise attitude strategyy during cruise, was to maintain the -X-axis pointed in the direction of the Sun for optimum power, while keeping the MGA boresight as close as possible to the Earth. This strategy allowed a telecom link to Earth using the LGA or MGA antenna, while providing sufficient power for spacecraft operations.
Phoenix was a three-axis stabilized spacecraft utilizing RCS thrusters for attitude maintenance. Attitude variations, caused by perturbations, were allowed within a set of deadbanding constraints defined by spacecraft telecom, power and thermal constraints. The Attitude Control System (ACS) commanded the thrusters to fire each time the attitude reached the limits of the deadband. The deadbanding strategy varied during cruise based on the constraints, the Sun-Earth-probe (SEP) angle, and the spacecraft range to the Sun and Earth. The tighter the deadbands, the more thrusting was necessary to keep the attitude inside the constraints. This, in turn, imparted more ∆V and uncertainty into the trajectory.
It was important to model the ∆V imparted to the system in the orbit determination (OD) process in order to meet the delivery accuracy requirements for atmospheric entry. For this reason, the flight system recorded a telemetry packet with thruster information every time a thruster pulse was fired. That telemetry was downlinked and transformed into a text file known as the Small Force File (SFF), which was directly input into the OD and trajectory propagation process. The SFF contained information such as pulse time, pulse length, thruster number, moleled ∆V, and attitude at the time of the pulse. A more detail discussion on the in-flight attitude control performance can be found in References 1 and 2.
C. Propulsion
The PHX propulsion system, inside the entry vehicle, was a monopropellant hydrazine system that operated in a blowdown mode. The system included the hardware needed to perform attitude control, trajectory correction maneuvers [TCMs] , and terminal descent control, during the Cruise, the Approach and the EDL phases. The hardware consisted of two propellant tanks , four 1-lbf RCS thrusters, four 5-lbf TCM thrusters, and twelve 68-lbf terminal descent thrusters. The two propellant tanks were pressurized with Helium at a nominal tank pressure of 310 psia and carried approximately 65.0 kg of usable propellant. Figure 44 shows the PHX spacecraft in cruise configuration, including the locations of the four rocket engine modules (REMs) used during the Cruise phase. Each REM consisted of an RCS thruster and a TCM thruster. Both the RCS and TCM thrusters were mounted on the Lander and extended through the backshell. Each thruster was scarfed to the contour of the backshell. All TCM thruster nozzles were in the -X-axis direction in the spacecraft coordinate system. Due to the scarfed nozzles, the effective thrust direction for each tof the TCM thrusters was estimated to be offset from the nozzle direction by approximately 2.5°.
Each RCS thruster had a component of thrust in all three spacecraft axes. The thrust directions were designed to be balanced in the Y and Z axes, but not in the X-axis. Therefore, every time an RCS thruster was fired, there was a ∆V imparted to the spacecraft in the +X direction. Although the Y and Z directions were designed to be balanced, the non-determinism of attitude maintenance (deadbanding) caused some thrusters to be fired more than others, leading to an overall imbalance that imparted ∆V in the Y and Z directions as well. Additional ∆V was imparted to the spacecraft in those directions due to thruster misalignments and thruster-tothruster thrust variations. For a more detail regarding the RCS thruster performance, refer to Reference 1.
III. Navigation
The navigation element of the PHX flight operations included three primary components: trajectory reconstruction and prediction analysis (also known as orbit determination, OD), trajectory control through propulsive maneuver design and analysis, and EDL and landing dispersions analysis. The following primary navigation functions were performed during PHX cruise:
• Processed radiometric tracking data (Doppler, range, ∆VLBI, UHF) and estimated the spacecraft state and associated uncertainties.
• Estimated the spacecraft ephemeris (including reconstruction and prediction) and ancillary trajectory data products.
• Performed EDL trajectory analysis and updated desired atmospheric entry aimpoints for Trajectory Correction Maneuvers (TCMs). Evaluated landing site coordinates and landing dispersion footprints (aka, landing ellipse).
• Determined the desired ∆V vector for TCMs to achieve the specified atmospheric entry aimpoint and verified the TCM implementation provided by the spacecraft team.
• Provided real-time monitoring during TCMs and reconstructed the TCM ∆V using pre-and post-TCM tracking data.
• Performed EDL trajectory analysis and provided inputs for uplink of EDL parameter updates.
• Processed PHX and Mars Odyssey or Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter radiometric tracking data and estimated the Lander position on the surface of Mars.
• Provided support for the UHF communications links between the Lander and the Mars orbiters (effort continuing through the surface phase).
Figure 4. Spacecraft in Cruise Configuration
A. Mission Requirements Six key navigation requirements drove the maneuver analysis and design for PHX. These were:
Planetary Protection Requirements
NASA's planetary protection office imposes the following two requiments on the navigation element of all Mars missions. First, the probability of impact of Mars by the launch vehicle (LV) upper stage shall be less than 10 -4 . To accomplish this, the LV injection dispersions were mapped to Mars target B-plane. Based on the mapped dispersions, the appropriate biased aimpoint B-plane target was chosen for the LV in order to satisfy this requirement (this process is described in Ref. 4 ).
Second, the probability of non-nominal impact (NNIP) of Mars by the spacecraft due to failure during the cruise phase shall not exceed 10 -2 . This nececitated that TCM-1 target also be biased away from Mars.
Mission-total statistical ∆V budget
PHX mission required that mission-total ∆V (to a 99% proability, also referred to as ∆V99) should not exceed 56 m/s. This requirement was derived from two facts. First, PHX was using the 2001 MSP'01 spacecraft with a propulsion system configuration that shared the same propellant tank for all ACS, TCM, and EDL systems. Two, in order to maximize the success probality for the EDL phase, only 25 kg of the loaded propellant was allocated for the combined ACS and TCM usage. Of this, about 17.5 kg was assigned for TCM expendature translating into a 56 m/s ∆V capability.
TCM development timeline
The time from navigation data cutoff to maneuver execution for the first three TCMs was 5 days. This time encompassed the orbit determination, TCM design and the corrresponding spacecraft command generation and validation, as well as two opportunities for command sequence uplink. The development time was compressed to 26 hours for TCMs 4 and 5, and 20 hours for TCM-6.
Atmospheric Entry Delivery Accuracy
The nominal inertial atmospheric entry flight path angle (EFPA) for PHX was -13.0° with a 3σ uncertainty of ±0.20°. This tight EFPA uncertainty was capability-driven and was necessary in order to afford the greatest flexibility for landing sight selection. The smaller the uncertainty, the smaller the along-track dimention of the landing ellipse. Smaller landing ellipses allowed more flexibility and more options for landing site selection in presence of landing site hazards (steep slopes, size and number of rocks, etc.).
Spacecraft Telecom Availability During Critical Events
PHX project deemed TCMs 1 and 6 critical navigation events. As such, the Project levied a requirement on the navigation function to be capable of acquiring two-way coherent X-band Doppler during TCMs 1 and 6. However, the project was prepared to request a waver if implementation of this requirement imposed excessive risk on the flight operations.
Off-Sun pointing duration limit
The thermal subsystem required that the total off-Sun pointing time during TCMs not to exceed 20 minutes.
B. TCM Profile
A total of six TCMs were planned in order to meet the stringent atmospheric entry interface conditions. An additional two contingency TCMs were also planned in case unexpected amomalies prevented execution of the last two nominal TCMs. Figure 5 shows the locations of the six nominal TCMs on the interplanetary trajectory to Mars. Table 1 lists the name, the location relative to launch and entry events, the nominal start epoch, as well as a brief description of the rationale for each TCM. TCMs 1 and 2 were placed in the early cruise phase in order to remove the LV injection bias and injectin errors. Generally speaking, the later a TCM is performed, the higher the desired ∆V would be. In order to keep the pre-launch estimate of the mission-total ∆V99 below the 56 m/s budget, it was necessary to not only schedule TCM-1 as early as 6 days after launch, but also to combine the design of TCM-1 along with TCM-2 in an optimized manner. Still, plans were also drawn to perform TCM-1 even earlier after launch in order to further mitigate an unlikely launch vehicle anomalous injection. Because of TCM-1,2 optimization, TCM-1 would not remove the entire injection bias and error. Also, since TCM-1 would be the largest TCM, it would have large execution errors. Hence, TCM-2 was originally scheduled to occur at 60 days after launch with the purpose of removing the remaining injection bias and error, as well as TCM-1 execution error. For operational reasons that will be explained later, TCM-2 was delayed to launch + 81 days.
TCMs 3 through 6x were scheduled for the approach phase (entry minus 45 days to entry minus 3 hours). Since TCM-2 had targeted the entry interface aimpoint, all the remaining TCMs were essentially statistical in nature. That is, the only purpose for each was to correct the OD and maneuver execution errors associated with the previous TCM. TCM-3 was scheduled at Entry -45 days in order to correct TCM-2 targeting errors, as well as the accumulated navigation errors during the nearly 6 months since TCM-2. TCM-4, at Entry -15 days, would correct TCM-3 delivery errors and keep TCM-5 from getting too large. TCM-5 would correct TCM-4 delivery errors, and to a 99% probability, deliver the entry vehicle inside the FPA survivability corridor for the EDL system. A large TCM-5 would have undesirable delivery accuracy with respect to survivability, and may also adversely affect TCM-6 delivery accuracy. TCM-5x was scheduled for Entry -5.3 days as a contingency for TCM-5. TCM-6, at Entry -21 hours, would correct TCM-5/5x delivery errors and would be the final nominal opportunity to target the atmospheric entry aimpoint. TCM-6x, at Entry -8 hours, was a contingency for TCM-6. This TCM was designed at the same time as TCM-6 and served two purposes. First, if for any reason TCM-6 commands could not be uplinked, or the spacecraft could not execute it, TCM-6x would be loaded at a later scheduled uplink opportunity and executed. Second, even after TCM-6 was executed, if the OD solution (with an OD data cutoff as late as TCM-6x -5.5 hours) revealed a large target miss, due possibly to an earlier undetected navigation error, the designed TCM-6x would be used as a member of a set of TCM-6xm menu items. TCM-6xm were a discrete set of 25 pre-designed, pre-tested TCMs that span the entire TCM-5 surface delivery ellipse with the purpose of moving a predicted landing point from anywhere in this ellipse (plus three extreme cases outside this ellipse) to within 20 kilometers of the desired landing target. 
IV. Propulsive Maneuver Analysis and Design
Propulsive maneuver design must accomplish mission requirements in the presence of known pre-launch mission and/or spacecraft constraints, as well as the constraints and limitations discovered during flight operations. A successful maneuver design strategy achieves mission goals with reasonable margin and operational flexibility, in order to allow for unexpected anomalies, while at the same time avoids unnecessary complexity and risk.
A. Implementation Modes
The PHX spacecraft could only implement TCMs in a turn-burn-turn mode. The four 5-lb TCM thrusters point in the spacecraft -X-axis direction. Thruster nozzles were cut in a way to make the nozzle exit plane flush with the back shell (known as scarfing). This caused the effective nozzle direction for each thruster to be approximately 2.5° away from the -X-axis direction. However, the symmetrical configuration of the 4 REMs causes the directional thrust offsets to cancel each other out, allowing the effective combined TCM thrust direction to be aligned with the -X-axis (baring any thruster misalignments and thruster-to-thruster variability). Therefore, to perform a velocity change in the trajectory (i., e., to execute a ∆V), the spacecraft would rotate such that the spacecraft +X direction was aligned with the desired ∆V direction. Once this attitude reorientation was complete, the spacecraft fired its TCM thrusters until the desired ∆V magnitude, as sensed by the accelerometer, was achieved. TCM implementation would be complete after the spacecraft rotated back to the nominal cruise attitude. This is known as a turn-burn-turn implementation mode.
The coupled RCS thrusters on PHX, which are used to start and stop the turns (also known as slews) and maintain the rotation rate, are not balanced. As such, every time a slew is performed, a certain amount of ∆V is imparted to the spacecraft. Although analytical methods along with propulsion system and spacecraft dynamics modeling were used in order to model/estimate the slew-induced ∆Vs, still, their uncertainty remained large. This contributed to significant TCM execution errors arising from slews to and from the desired burn attitude. Numerous prelaunch analyses had been performed in order to better model/predict the performance of the ACS, which includes the control algorithm and the avionics hardware). Furthermore, after TCM-1, extensive in-flight analyses, including active and passive thruster calibration campaigns, were undertaken in order to better characterize the ACS performance (such as pulse-to-pulse, as well as thruster-to-thruster variability). Slew reconstruction analyses after each TCM, as well as a better characterized ACS, were key in improving the navigation delivery accuracy as the mission progressed.
TCM implementations were further complicated by the fact that instead of the simple three main blocks of turn, burn, and turn command sequences, depending on the slew type (explained later), a complex set of ten or twelve command blocks had to be executed. That is, to insure a more accurate implementation, in addition to the three main blocks, a combination of rate-damp and inertial-hold command blocks were needed in order to zero-out the unwanted pre and post main burn rotation rates and attitude offsets within the attitude deadbands. Each of these propulsive events induced its own ∆V and associated ∆V error. PHX used two main variations of slew types within the turn-burn-turn implementation mode. The first involved the use of different slew rates to reorient the spacecraft attitude. Analysis showed that slower rates, requiring fewer thruster firings to start and stop the slews, lead to smaller slew-induced ∆V errors. The second involved two different slew strategies to return from the burn attitude to the nominal cruise attitude. One would slew the spacecraft in the reverse direction compared to the slew to the burn attitude, hence referred to as there-and-back slew type. The other would continue in the same direction as the slew to the burn attitude until a full 360° angle with respect to the pre-burn orientation was achieved, hence dubbed full-circle slew type. TCM implementations with there-and-back slew strategy required a ten-block command sequence, while those with the full-circle slew strategy required a twelve-block command sequence. Full-circle slew strategies lead to smaller slew-induced ∆V errors for certain situations because most of the ∆V, including the corresponding ∆V error, from thruster firings to start and stop the two slew segments would cancel each other out. Generally, for slews greater than 60°, the full-circle slew strategy with 1 deg/s rate would provide smaller slew ∆V errors. However, for slews less than 60°, the there-and-back strategy with a 0.4 deg/s rate would lead to better slew performance. Additional discussion on the slew behavior and strategy can be found in Reference 1.
To implement a TCM, the desired ∆V, designed by the navigation team, had to be decomposed by the ACS team into the corresponding 10 or 12 component ∆Vs. The ACS software predicted the ∆Vs induced by each of the slew-related segments and subtracted their vector-total from the desired ∆V. The resulting difference, called the main burn, was the ∆V that was executed at the main burn attitude.
B. Design Constraints
A number of constraints had to be satisfied in the design of TCMs. The purpose of the early cruise TCMs was to remove the LV injection bias and injection error. Pre-launch analysis had shown that removing the entire LV bias and a possible worst case 3σ injection error at TCM-1 would lead to a ∆V99 far exceeding the 56 m/s mission ∆V budget. Consequently, in order to save sufficient ∆V, in addition to the potential need to perform TCM-1 as early as L + 6 days, its design had to be combined with that of TCM-2 such that their combined total ∆V was minimized. The optimization allowed for the combination of TCMs 1 and 2, not TCM-1 alone, to remove the injection miss and bias. In general, orbital energy corrections are most efficient when ∆V is highest in the orbit, while orbital plane change and corrections are most efficient when ∆V is lowest in the orbit. The optimizer takes advantage of this fact and optimally splits the total needed ∆V between TCMs 1 and 2.
Another constraint relates to a JPL design principle requiring projects to maintain telecom availability during critical flight operations. PHX project deemed TCMs 1 and 6 critical from a navigation perspective. As such, these two TCMs had to be designed such that in the main burn attitude, the LGA boresight angle with respect to Earth direction would not exceed 120° for TCM-1 and 63° for TCM-6 in order to guarantee telecom link. Furthermore, it is always desired to place the TCMs at a time that is convenient for the operations personnel. However, it is more desirable to have the TCMs placed such that the command uplink window (usually several hours before TCM time), as well as the execution time itself be during Deep Space Network antenna overlap periods to guard against uplink interruption or loss of signal due to any single antenna failure. This resulted in some of the TCMs being placed at very late hours of the night or early hours of the morning. Once the TCM command sequences were loaded, they executed autonomously. As soon as the main burn ∆V was achieved, the burn would be terminated by the accelerometer on board the spacecraft; however, predicted minimum and maximum burn times were also loaded on board, allowing the TCM sequence to cut off the burn in order to avoid large ∆V errors in case of an accelerometer failure.
After launch, a third constraint was revealed pertaining to the minimum ∆V size that could accurately be performed, or even be resolved, into implementation components. This arose from the fact that slews to and from the TCM burn attitudes not only induced ∆Vs, but their associated ∆V errors could be relatively large. For a small desired ∆V, the slew ∆V errors could potentially be large enough to make the uncertainty in the achieved ∆V larger than the intended correction. Worst yet, for small enough TCM ∆Vs, the predicted slew ∆V could be larger than the intended ∆V, making it impossible to decompose the desired ∆V into the slew-induced ∆Vs plus the main burn. This created a major challenge for the design of the approach TCMs, which inherently have small magnitudes.
C. Design Strategy
The principle maneuver design strategy was to deliver the entry vehicle to the desired surface landing-site, while satisfying all design constraints and allowing sufficient flexibility to do small landing site retargeting as late as TCM-4, and at the same time avoid potentially unacceptable risk. The EDL team had initially determined the atmospheric entry interface target based on the pre-launch nominal interplanetary trajectory. However, targeting this interface aimpoint from a trajectory other than the nominal case, would map to a surface location offset from the desired landing site. This is because the maneuver targeting process could only correct 3 target parameters, leaving other parameters, including the incoming trajectory asymptote, not fully corrected to the nominal value. Consequently, since the launch vehicle injection is never perfect, the target interface aimpoint must be updated to compensate for the variations in the incoming asymptote. In fact, during flight, every time the orbit determination team would receive new tracking data and update the estimated state and the corresponding predicted trajectory, the entry aimpoint would have to be updated.
The objective of TCMs 1 and 2 was to remove major injection errors and the injection bias, requiring relatively large ∆V magnitudes. Due to TCM-1,2 optimization, TCM-1 would only target an intermediate point between where the LV left the spacecraft and the final aimpoint. Hence, TCM-2 was the first TCM to actually target entry, albeit with large delivery errors, caused primarily by the following two factors. First, the maneuver execution errors are relatively large and would have a long time, more than 7 months, to propagate into the future. Second, the OD errors are also large during early cruise, particularly because of the inability to adequately characterize and accurately predict the behavior of the small forces. The combined effects of the execution errors and the OD errors during early TCMs, lead to estimated delivery inaccuracies that were much larger than any attempted fine-tuning correction at the entry interface aimpoint. In spite of this, the navigation team updated the entry aimpoint, even for TCM-2. For all other TCMs, it was essential that the targeted entry interface aimpoint be updated via an automated script described below.
The process to update the atmospheric entry interface aimpoint involved the maneuver targeting software and the EDL atmospheric flight trajectory propagation and targeting software. Given an updated OD solution, first the maneuver targeting software was run to design a TCM, targeting the previously updated entry aimpoint target parameters. These parameters include entry radius, FPA, B-plane angle, and epoch. Subsequently, the EDL software would propagate the entry state, generated by the maneuver targeting software, to the ground and determine the achieved location. Since the entry asymptote is different from the previous solution, the new surface location would differ from the desired landing site. If this surface miss is smaller than the desired tolerance, the aimpoint does not need to be updated and the process is considered converged. If, however, the surface miss is larger than the desired targeting tolerance, then the EDL software, using the new entry state, updates the entry epoch and B-plane angle components of the entry target parameters. Note that entry FPA is fixed as a design constraint, while entry radius is fixed, by definition, at 3522.2 km. This process is iterated until the achieved surface miss distance is within the desired tolerance. For TCM-3 through TCM-6 it would take approximately 3 iterations for the process to converge, while for TCM-6x, it took more than 6 to 7 iterations. Manually, each iteration in this process would take up to 30 minutes. Given that the allotted time for the complete maneuver design process, particularly for TCMs 4 and later, was only one hour, and that the actual design of the maneuver was only a part of the process, maneuver design could not be accomplished without automation. A script was developed that performed this process, called surface targeting, at a speed of less than three minutes per iteration.
V. Final Approach Targeting Strategy
During early cruise, ACS analyses revealed that depending on the required slew size and strategy, the smallest ∆V that could be executed with sufficient accuracy ranged from 0.05 to 0.10 m/s. Extensive maneuver design analysis was undertaken to improve our knowledge of the statistical characteristics for each of the TCMs after TCM-3. Two particular areas were of interest, the probability of the ∆V magnitude being less than 0.10 m/s, and the probability that the ∆V direction would be in a favorable direction, requiring a small slew angle. The directional information was also of interest in order to assess the probability of having telecom during each of these TCMs. The answer to the latter was rather straight forward. Considering that TCM-2 had targeted the entry aimpoint, all subsequent TCMs were essentially statistical in nature, hence, were equally probable to be in any direction in space.
Early OD assessments after TCM-2 indicated that TCM-3 magnitude was greater than 1.3 m/s, hence TCM-3 minimum ∆V size was not an issue. Also, TCM-4 was primarily intended to keep TCM-5 from being too large in case unforeseen anomalous events occurred after TCM-3. Moreover, there were two nominal TCM opportunities after TCM-4 for making trajectory correction and refinements. Therefore, the focus of the analysis was drawn to TCMs 5 and 6. The goal of the analysis was twofold, to statistically characterize TCMs 5 and 6 (and their contingencies, TCM-5x and -6x), and to identify possible alternative targeting strategies to mitigate unfavorable ∆V size and directions. Improved implementation accuracy for TCMs 5 and 6 would not only increase their respective delivery accuracies, but would also increase the probability that TCM-5 would become the last TCM, eliminating the need for TCM-6 altogether. Table 2a shows the summary ∆V statistics for TCMs 4, 5, and 6 based on a 5000-sample linear Monte Carlo simulation, indicating TCM-5 has the smallest ∆V magnitude distribution (process described in Reference 6). In fact, if TCM-4 were performed, the probability that TCM-5 ∆V would be less than 0.10 m/s was about 75%. Table 2b shows similar statistics for TCMs 5 and 6 assuming TCM-4 is skipped. As expected, TCM-5 statistics are nearly twice as large as TCM-4 statistics in Table 2a because TCM-5 is almost half the way between TCM-4 and entry (note that ∆V cost of making target corrections is nearly linear as a function of time-to-go). Table 2b also shows that a nearly doubling of TCM-5 does not adversely affect TCM-6 ∆V statistics, hence its delivery accuracy. A natural conclusion was that it was highly likely that the project would decide to skip TCM-4 to increase the odds for a more accurate implementation of TCM-5. Table 2b . TCM-5 and 6 ∆V statistics based on Linear analysis with TCM-4 skipped.
An inherent weakness of the linear Monte Carlo statistics is that all perturbed trajectories are mapped (not integrated) to the same nominal entry state, not taking into account incoming asymptote variations, which would require that entry state be adjusted in order to achieve the target landing site. In order to improve the accuracy of the TCM statistics, a non-linear Monte Carlo simulation was performed in which 2000 perturbed states shortly before TCM-5 and 2000 perturbed states shortly before TCM-6 were targeted to the nominal landing site (using the process described in the targeting strategy section earlier) by adjusting the entry state for each perturbed trajectory. The results from the integrated 2000-sample Monte Carlo simulations showed the following statistics for TCM-6:
• There was a 5% probability the ∆V magnitude would be less than 0.10 m/s (leading to unacceptable maneuver execution error.
• There was a 50% probability the maneuver slew size was larger than 90°.
• There was a 70% probability the LGA-to-Earth angle was greater than 63°, leading to no telecom availability.
o Note: PHX project had planned to request a waiver for this requirement if needed.
A. Specialized Targeting (Null ∆V Augmentation)
Although by skipping TCM-4 the probability of an unfavorable TCM-5 size decreased, the odds for an unfavorable (small) TCM-6 were still unacceptable. The next step in the analysis was to investigate whether a different, more robust, targeting methodology existed that would mitigate the above undesirable characteristics in TCM-6.
Using the navigation targeting software and the EDL software, a set of surface displacement partials with respect to TCM-6 ∆V components in the spacecraft coordinates were numerically calculated.
Given the calculated numerical partials (d(Lon/Lat)/d(∆V s/c ), Equation 1 illustrates the relation between surface longitude/latitude displacements (∆Lon, ∆Lat) and the ∆V components in the spacecraft coordinates (∆Vx,…) s/c . For a desired surface displacement (to correct a surface miss), this is an indeterminate problem of two equations and three unknowns, with an infinite number of solutions. One special case was a zero surface displacement (∆Lon = ∆Lat = 0). That is, one component of the ∆V could be selected arbitrarily, with the other two components determined as a function of the first one, such that the resulting surface displacement is zero. The resulting surface-null ∆V (here on referred to as a null ∆V) is a function of orbit dynamics (both pre and post atmospheric entry) and the TCM location on the orbit. Though the partials were significantly different for different TCMs, they were mostly insensitive to small orbit variations due to OD uncertainty or maneuver execution errors. As such, the null ∆Vs derived from the nominal trajectory at each TCM location, could be treated as having a fixed direction in space. The following relations describe the null ∆V (in the spacecraft coordinates), where a and b are derived from Equation 1. A novel solution arose from the null ∆V idea. During the approach phase, the nominal spacecraft attitude was to point the solar arrays directly at the Sun, Figure 6 . Therefore, a burn in this attitude would have a (1,0,0) direction in the spacecraft coordinate frame. Or, more generally, any ∆V with a positive X s/c component, would point in the half of the sky away from the sun, requiring a less than 90° slew. For TCM-6, the null ∆V direction was 142° away from the Sun direction. As illustrated in Figure  6 , an appropriately sized positive ∆V X would lead to a null ∆V that, when linearly added to the standard TCM design ∆V solution (referred to as the searched-in ∆V), would
To Sun produce a resultant ∆V with desirable magnitude and slew angle, but achieving, essentially the same landing target. Initially, the null ∆V approach was developed for TCM-6. However once its effectiveness was confirmed in operations readiness tests (ORTs), the method was extended to improve the ∆V characteristics for other approach TCMs as well.
Searched-in AEV
Although it appeared the null ∆V method for augmenting the searched-in ∆Vs had eliminated the accuracy issues associated with TCM implementation, it did have some limitations and side effects that had to be taken into account. First, the null ∆V was derived based on linear partial derivatives. Therefore, though the surface-miss distances obtained from integrating (not mapping) the trajectory on to the surface were negligible for small null ∆V magnitudes, these augmented surface target errors were not negligible above a certain ∆V magnitude threshold. For TCM-6, this threshold was determined to be close to 1.5 m/s (associated to a 1 km surface targeting error).
A second, and perhaps more important adverse effect of augmenting a searched-in ∆V with a null ∆V was that it would change the entry FPA, and more notably, entry epoch. At TCM-6, the partials of FPA and entry epoch with respect to the null ∆V magnitude were -0.028°/(m/s) and -28 sec/(m/s), respectively. That is, a 1 m/s null ∆V, would steepen the entry FPA by 0.028° and cause a 28 second earlier arrival when compared with the searched-in entry target parameters. The 0.028° change was well within the expected and acceptable entry FPA errors. However, a -28 sec entry epoch change would push against the acceptable limit for EDL telecom considerations. To facilitate the EDL telecom availability through the wrap-around UHF antenna on the back shell, the orbital phases of Mars orbiters Odyssey and MRO had to be planned and implemented long before PHX would arrive at Mars. To enable the antenna link, the orbiters would have to be at specified locations in their orbit at the time of PHX entry. The error tolerance on PHX arrival time relative to Odyssey orbit phasing (a required spacial geometry between the two spacecraft) in order to enable the UHF link to Odyssey, which does not have a gimbaled UHF antenna, was on the order of 1 minute on the early side. However, it was desired that PHX not arrive more than 30 seconds earlier in order to allow margin for other sources of error. This essentially would reduce the null ∆V threshold from 1.5 m/s to approximately 1 m/s.
To understand the characteristics of the null-∆V-augmented TCM targeting strategy (referred to as specialized targeting), two different null ∆V scenarios were applied to the searched-in integrated 2000-sample Monte Carlo simulation results for TCM-6. In case 1, null ∆Vs of sufficient magnitude were applied to all the samples with greater than 90° slews such that the resultant ∆V had a 90° slew. The resulting set had some ∆Vs with magnitudes less than 0.10 m/s. In case 2, additional null ∆V was applied to all the cases with smaller than 0.1 m/s magnitudes. A summary of the statistics for these three sets is presented in Table 3 . The searched-in ∆Vs, in addition to having a 5% probability of being smaller than 0.10-m/s, are more than 50% likely to have slew and LGA-to-Earth angles larger than 90° (should be less than 63° for telecom availability). The statistics for specialized targeting case 1 show significant improvement in the slew angle and telecom availability. The statistics for case 2 show additional improvements for slew angle and telecom with 100% guarantee for ∆V magnitude being greater than 0.10 m/s. The last column shows that even for the case 2 augmentation, the worst case arrival at Mars is only 29 seconds earlier than the nominal epoch, an entry epoch offset that is within acceptable telecom limits, even for Odyssey.
The specialized targeting strategy was considered a powerful tool and was deemed essential for improving the TCM implementation and the resulting delivery accuracies. Further analysis showed that this strategy could be employed for all TCMs starting from TCM-5 (entry target partials at TCM-4 showed high sensitivity to even small null ∆V magnitudes, rendering the use of this method at TCM-4 impractical). design operations, a python script was developed that would automatically ingest a searched-in TCM, use the corresponding TCM null ∆V partials, and calculate the desired augmented ∆V magnitude in a matter of a few seconds. If the resulting slew and LGA-to-Earth angles were not satisfactory, the minimum augmented ∆V magnitude could be increased up to the telecom entry epoch constraint. The decision to use the specialized targeting was made on a case-by-case basis at the time of each TCM design.
B. TCM-6xm design
TCM-6x was a contingency for TCM-6, to be uploaded and executed in the event TCM-6 did not execute at all. As such, it would be designed at the same time as TCM-6, using the same OD solution. Both designs would go through the full design process, including verification of the implementation plan and uplink sequences. However, in addition to being able to make a planned course correction even as late as 8 hours before entry, there was a concern regarding two improbable, yet not impossible failure modes during or after TCM-6, a partial execution of TCM-6, or an anomalous thruster firing after TCM-6. Both of these scenarios would put the spacecraft on an off nominal course during a time that a full TCM design and verification was impossible. Consequently, there was a strong desire to have a course correction emergency response plan if the post-TCM-6 OD revealed a significant target miss. To accommodate this scenario, a menu of pre-designed and pre-tested TCM-6x cases, referred to as TCM-6xm, were desired. This was a tremendous undertaking, involving the maneuver and AACS teams, and taking more than two months to accomplish. Figure 7 illustrates TCM-6xm menu item selection strategy. The light blue ellipse depicts the TCM-5 3σ delivery dispersions, with a 240 km semi-major axis and a 20 km semi-minor axis, while the red ellipse represents the TCM-6 99% dispersions on the surface. The center of the ellipses represents the landing site target.
The black and dark green square background is the local Mars hazard map (more details on surface hazards can be found in Reference 3). The yellow points represent discrete TCM-6xm menu cases. From each one of these grid points a TCM-6x was designed and with the planned implementation fully verified. The points along the ellipse major axis would correct purely up-or down-track errors, while the points on the minor axis would correct pure cross track errors. All other points would correct an along/cross track combination error. Some modifications were later made to the grid of menu items. Two extreme up/down track cases were added to correct a potential 2.5° error in the FPA, to move the spacecraft into a survivable regime. Moreover, a case was added for a larger correction capability from a cross track area south of the target, which was considered a high risk area due to surface features. In general, the strategy for TCM-6xm was not to fine-tune the targeting, rather to execute a course correction to mitigate potentially mission-ending situations. At the end, the need to use TCM-6xm never arose. Table 4 presents a summary of all the trajectory correction maneuvers that were performed during LGA flight. It is worth noting that although a 56 m/s ∆V budget had been allocated for the mission, overall, less than 24 m/s of ∆V was performed. However, before the specific details of each TCM could be discussed, it is essential to present an assessment of the launch performance and its effects on the total mission ∆V and other flight operations areas.
VI. Flight Results

A. Launch Vehicle Performance
Although a great deal of analysis and effort went into reducing the predicted Launch vehicle injection dispersions, still, injection uncertainties account for approximately 75% of the pre-launch statistical 99% missiontotal ∆V (∆V99) requirement. The project had allocated approximately 17.5 kg, of the 65.2 kg total propellant load, to cover a 99% worst-case launch error, requiring a ∆V capability of 56 m/s for a successful entry targeting. PHX launched from Space Launch Complex 17A at Cape Canavral, Florida, via a Delta II 7925 on 4-August-2007, the second day of the launch period. Liftoff occurred at 09:26:34.000 UTC, with a 93° launch azimuth. Interplanetary injection was within expected dispersions. The Earth relative LV target conditions are specified by the injection energy per unit mass (C 3 ), the declination of the launch asymptote (DLA), and the right ascension of the launch asymptote (RLA). These targets are specified at the targeting interface point (TIP), defined to occur 10 minutes after Stage III ignition. Table 5 shows the LV performance at TIP, with respect to the individual injection target parameters, as well as in the Mars B-plane (defined in Appendix). Although the errors for the individual target parameters at TIP were all at or below 1σ , Table 5b shows that the correlations between these parameters may cause the error in the B-plane to be slightly larger than 1σ. This is illustrated in Figure 7 . Figure 7 shows the injection target and its 1σ, 2σ, and 3σ dispersion ellipses in the Mars B-plane. An early OD solution, using about one day of tracking data, shows the achieved target at Mars (labeled od004 on the plot) to be slightly outside the 1σ LV delivery ellipse in the direction away from Mars in the B-plane. Achieved time of closest approach (TCA) is also shown to be about 5 days later than the nominal epoch.
B. Non-Nominal Impact Probability
An injection error away from Mars would increase the needed ∆V but would also reduce the non-nominal impact probability (NNIP), and vise versa. NASA Planetary Protection requirements state that the overall probability of non-nominal impact of Mars due to failure during the Cruise and Approach phases shall not exceed 1.0 x 10 -2 . A non-nominal impact is defined as an impact that could result in the break-up of the spacecraft and release of terrestrial contaminants on Mars. Overall non-nominal impact probability is the cumulative sum of the probability of nonnominal impact following each TCM. The probability of nonnominal impact for TCMs 1 through 5 is defined as the probability of impact after each TCM multiplied by the probability that the following maneuver does not occur. This is illustrated in Table 64 by the P(i) and Q(i+1) values, respectively. The probability of nonnominal impact for TCM-6, on the other hand, is defined as an impact resulting from a Mars entry flight path angle outside the specified entry corridor: -13.0° ± 0.27 deg. Prelaunch, the NNIP had been estimated to be 0.86 x 10 -2 . However, the injection error away from Mars, eliminated not only the contribution from injection, but also the contribution from TCM-1 (partly due to TCM-1,2 optimization) leading to a post-TCM-2 NNIP estimate of 0.79 x 10 -2 . Cumulative Total 7.888E-03 P(i) : probability of impact after maneuver i (based on 50000-sample Monte Carlo simulations): = total impact probability (100 km atmosphere) for all maneuvers except TCM-6 = probability of impact for non-nominal entry flight path angles for TCM-6 Q(i+1) : probability of not being able to execute maneuver i+1 given that maneuver i has occurred As of the date of this report (September 25, 2007), TCM-1 has already occurred. Table 6 . Probability of Non-nominal Impact, evaluated after TCM-2 execution.
C. TCM-1
Days to Next TCM
combined OD trajectory reconstruction and prediction errors, as well as maneuver execution errors, is also presented at the sigma level, the ratio of the error to its expected 1σ value, in the last column.
The near 1σ injection would allow the execution of TCM-1 to be delayed significantly and still be well within the 56 m/s mission ∆V budget. Yet, various project considerations, including schedule and workforce considerations, lead to the decision to execute TCM-1 at its nominally planned location of L+6 days. TCM-1 design had to start at L+1 day to accommodate the 5-day design process. Still, in order to leave as much propellant for the EDL phase as possible, TCM-1 had to be designed along with TCM-2 in an optimized manner such that their total ∆V was minimized. In this optimization, TCM-1 ∆V was 18.5 m/s, with TCM-2 ∆V estimated at 3.6 m/s. Their combined total of 22.1 m/s would turn out to be approximately 91% of the total 24 m/s cruise ∆V usage. Figure 7 illustrates that the optimized target for TCM-1 was approximately 90,000 km away from the entry nominal target in the B-plane. The targeted closest approach time was 13.5 hours later than the entry target time.
TCM-1 required a 58.5° (from the GNC maneuver approval report) slew to the burn attitude. A there-and-back slew with a 0.4 deg/sec rate was employed for its implementation, keeping the entire duration, from the start of the first slew to the end of the return slew, below 20 minutes. This is a limit, set by the thermal subsystem, on the maximum duration the spacecraft may be pointed away from the Sun. At the burn attitude, the LGA to Earth angle was 56.5°, satisfying the telecom limit of 120° at that close range from the Earth. TCM-1 used 5.855 kg of propellant.
For each TCMs 1 and 2, the ∆V was reconstructed via the OD process by fitting the solution through the burn and the pre-and post-maneuver tracking data. Table 8 shows the commanded as well as the reconstructed ∆Vs and the corresponding derived maneuver execution errors for TCMs 1 and 2. Although the total implemented burn (the sum of slews and the main burn) had a magnitude error well within the expected error for TCM-1, the pointing error was in excess of 19°. This manifested itself in the greater-than-2.3σ targeting error associated with TCM-1 (Table 7) . Moreover, this further supported the necessity for the thruster calibration campaigns, and the slew error reduction analyses that followed.
D. TCM-2
Shortly after launch, partly due to general spacecraft activities and schedule considerations, but most importantly in order to allow the active thruster calibration effort to come to fruition, TCM-2 had been delayed from the pre-launch location of October 3 (L+60 days), to October 16 (L+73 days). However, on Saturday, October 6, 07, the spacecraft entered a safe mode state caused by a computer reset, with a cosmic ray being the primary suspect for the anomalous even. The required additional time to determine the safing cause and analyze recovery plan options resulted in further delay of TCM-2 to October 24, 08 (L+81 days). TCM-2 was to target entry for the first time, same as in the TCM-1,2 optimization strategy.
A host of spacecraft thruster firing activities, including thruster calibration, a spacecraft safing and its related recovery activities, as well as better knowledge of small forces prediction, combined in such a way to make the final TCM-2 ∆V surprisingly similar to its earliest design only two days after launch. The final TCM-2 design was based on a solid OD solution, which included more than two months of tracking data, and a well characterized ACS system resulting from the thruster calibration campaign (Reference 1). TCM-2 magnitude was 3.61 m/s requiring less than a 15° slew, with a slew rate of 0.4 deg/s, to reach the burn attitude. The LGA-to-Earth and solar array (SA) norm-to-Sun angles were 17.1° and 56.7°, respectively, enabling telecom and being power-positive during the main burn. As expected, the post-maneuver trajectory and target reconstruction showed a much more accurate TCM-2 implementation, compared with that of TCM-1. Estimated slew ∆V magnitude error was 11.0 mm/s for TCM-1, while it was only 3.6 mm/s for TCM-2 (Reference 1). Consequently, the target delivery accuracy was better than 0.1σ (Table 7) in all parameters, with a total burn ∆V magnitude error of 0.03% and a pointing error of only 0.4 mrad ( Table 8 ).
E. TCM-3
TCM-3 was scheduled for April 10, 2008 21:00:00 UTC, at entry -45 days, which marked the transition from cruise to late cruise (or approach) phase. TCM-3, scheduled for nearly 5 months after TCM-2, was to correct TCM-2 delivery errors. A number of real events, in addition to a continuous refining of the trajectory reconstruction and prediction models, had caused the trajectory to deviate from the target since TCM-2 had been performed. On November 6, PHX reoriented to its late cruise attitude, which changed the effect of solar pressure torque on the spacecraft, altering the AACS response behavior. Furthermore, On November 15 th , the nominal attitude control deadbands were changed to the tighter approach phase configuration, a required configuration originally planned to occur at the transition to approach phase point. However, tighter deadbands result in more frequent ACS thruster firings leading to more propellant consumption and worse trajectory prediction uncertainties. Because of the favorable injection, propellant usage was no longer a concern. The advantage of the early attitude maintenance change, however, was that it enabled the AACS and the NAV teams to start characterizing the on-board attitude behavior months sooner than planned, improving the trajectory predictability models.
TCM-3 had a magnitude of 1.42 m/s with a slew of 145.6°. A full circle slew with a 1 deg/sec rate was selected to minimize slew errors and remain under the 20 minute total duration limit. At the burn attitude, both LGA to Earth and SA norm to Sun angles exceeded the limits for telecom and power availability. TCM-3 execution errors were very small (with a slew ∆V error of 3.8 mm/s, Ref. 1) allowing the overall targeting accuracy to be better than 0.1σ.
F. TCM-4
TCM-4 was planned to occur at entry -15 days, on May 10, 2008. TCM-3, executed 30 days earlier, had performed with very small delivery errors. The predicted entry FPA, based on the latest OD solution prior to TCM-4, was -12.680°. With respect to the recently updated nominal EFPA of -12.9335° to achieve the updated certified safe zone (CSZ) landing site, this was an error of about 0.254° on the shallow side. The corresponding surface miss was less than 52 km, mostly in a down track direction due to the shallow FPA error. The down-track surface errors, were in the most efficient direction to make corrections. The estimated magnitude for TCM-4 was only 0.017 m/s with a 56° slew angle. This correction was smaller than the knowledge and the control errors. With these characteristics, the implementation errors most likely would have been larger than the intended correction. Furthermore, specialized targeting (augmenting the ∆V with a null ∆V) was not feasible at 15 days before entry. Consequently, TCM-4 was cancelled in favor of delaying the surface miss correction until TCM-5. Another factor contributing to this decision was that in the days leading to TCM-4, the OD solution had been drifting up-track, towards the landing target (EFPA was becoming more negative, i.e., steeper). The concern was that if the OD solution continued to drift in the same direction, moving the predicted landing site in the up-track direction may be the wrong thing to do. The expectation was that with TCM-4 cancelled, TCM-5, which was half the distance to entry, would be approximately twice the size of TCM-4, approximately 0.033 m/s.
G. TCM-5
TCM-5, was scheduled to occur 8 days before entry on May 18, 2008, as far away from Mars as possible to allow for the OD solutions to converge prior to TCM-6 (at entry -21 hours), yet, as close to Mars as possible to improve delivery accuracy. Prelaunch, OD covariance analysis had predicted that TCM-4 delivery errors were too large for the EDL system from a FPA survivability standpoint. Hence, TCM-5, with a 3σ expected entry FPA error of ±1.29°, had been viewed as the earliest opportunity to move the trajectory into a survivable FPA corridor. However, in reality, the in-flight trajectory prediction and control had been better than expected. In fact, even as early as 3 days before TCM-4 (around May 7 th ), the EFPA error was 0.25°±1.0° 3σ. So the attention of the navigation team shifted to making TCM-5, potentially the last maneuver to be executed.
The OD solution had continued to move, though within its uncertainty, in the direction of steepening the EFPA to -12.855°, causing an up-track movement in the predicted landing site. This behavior, which continued through half the way between TCM-4 and TCM-5, could potentially be attributed to mismodeling of the non-gravitational forces (e.g., small forces) acting on the spacecraft (a complete discussion on the OD modeling can be found in Reference 2). The surface miss distance had reduced from 52 km down-track on May 7, to only 19.0 km down-track on May 14. However, in the following three days, it held steady. The OD solution on May 17, on which the final TCM-5 was to be designed, still showed an entry FPA angle of -12.854°, corresponding to a mostly down-track surface miss distance of 17.9 km. At last, the OD stability required to make a sound decision on TCM-5 had been reached.
In anticipation that TCM-4 may be cancelled, a TCM-5 design had been generated with every daily OD solution since the beginning of May. One thing had remained consistent, even after an atmospheric model change had led to a slight increase in the ∆V magnitude it remained below 0.05 m/s. The burn direction was also not favorable, with
LGA-to-Earth and slew angles larger than 110° and 80°, respectively. This would make an accurate implementation practically impossible. Numerous options were considered, most notable were several variations of the null ∆V augmentation, as well as an option to do a no-slew burn. The latter seemed very attractive at first, since theoretically, it would have no slew errors associated with it. However, this option was quickly dismissed because it would primarily correct the down-track error, leaving the predicted landing site at 6.3 km cross track to the south of the nominal target, where landing site hazards were more prevalent.
The only remaining viable option was to exercise the wellcharacterized, well-practiced specialized targeting strategy. Although options with larger magnitudes were weighed-in, for various considerations, the team decided on the minimum doable magnitude of 0.05 m/s. Table 9 shows the characteristics of the no-TCM option, the searched-in TCM-5 ∆V, and its selected null-∆V-augmented alternative. Figure 8 illustrates some of the TCM-5 related features on the surface of Mars, where only areas in green are considered safe for landing (all other colors represent different hazard features on the surface). It is worth noting that only areas where 99% of the TCM-6 delivery ellipse would be contained in green were considered as certified safe zone targets, satisfying all landing site safety criteria (a complete discussion of surface hazards and landing site safety is presented in Reference 3). The long ellipse is the TCM-5 NAV-only delivery ellipse to a 99% probability (excludes all the uncertainties associated with the EDL phase).
The surface miss distance in the no-TCM option was only 17.9 km. However, the predicted landing site, labeled od056 in Figure 8 , was outside the TCM-5 delivery ellipse, south east of the nominal target and too close to the hazardous areas. Hence, the no-TCM case was not a viable option. The searched-in option had only a 4.3 second offset relative to the nominal entry time. But it was too small in magnitude and had undesirable LGA-toEarth and slew angles. The 0.05 m/s specialized targeting option had the right combination of characteristics. Its LGA-to-Earth angle was only 44.9°, well within the 63° telecom limit at that range from Earth, and a 52.7° angle for both the slew and the SA norm to the Sun parameters. The entry offset time, at -16.3 seconds, was within the EDL telecom constraint, with sufficient margin, relative to Odyssey phasing. Although 0.06 m/s and 0.07 m/s ∆V options, with perhaps higher implementation accuracies, were also considered, the entry time offsets would be more negative, further reducing the EDL telecom margin. Interestingly, the two slew ∆Vs were 0.05 m/s each, while the main burn ∆V was less than 0.04 m/s, with the resultant ∆V magnitude being 0.05 m/s. Figure 8 shows the path that TCM-5 segments traced on the surface. The ∆V from the first slew moved from the location labeled od056 to the north west point labeled pre mainburn. The main burn moved the landing site from this point to the location labeled post mainburn. And finally, the ∆V from the slew back to the nominal attitude achieved the nominal target location. Although a great deal of analysis and deliberations went into TCM-6 decision process, at the end, TCM-5 turned out to be the last trajectory correction maneuver performed on PHX. Table 9 . Searched-in vs. specialized TCM-5 characteristics. 
H. TCM-6 and TCM-6x/xm
The first OD solution after TCM-5 with sufficient tracking data, showed the predicted landing site to be only 0.3 down track from the surface target. In the days that followed, the OD solution predicted landing site started to move in an up-track direction.
But, the solutions seemed to be converging, as indicated by a shrinking of the delivery ellipse with each solution being within the previous solution uncertainty. The criteria to perform TCM-6 or not was for the center of the expected dispersions to be inside the CSZ (discussed in detail in reference 3), as indicated by the light green contour in Figure 9 . The final OD solution, on the eve of landing day, showed that the solution had moved nearly 20 km in an almost purely up-track direction (Figure 9 , center of the white ellipse). However, the close proximity of the last three solutions (the red, the light blue, and the pink points on the plot), supported by their nearly concentric yet shrinking delivery ellipses, suggested that the OD solutions had converged. The final pre-TCM-6 OD solution being inside the CSZ area meant that all landing site safety criteria had been met without the maneuver, leading to a decision to not perform TCM-6.
The OD solutions continued to remain nearly the same, with reducing delivery uncertainties, up until entry. Consequently, none of the TCM-6x and TCM-6xm contingency plans were required. Figure 10 (left) shows the landing site location as predicted by the navigation process using the final pre-EDL OD solution (blue ellipse), and the ACS-reconstructed location (red circle) using the onboard IMU data generated during EDL). Figure 10 (right) shows the same data but mapped on to a real surface image taken by MRO. The final landing location was approximately 22 km east of the NAV-predicted landing site, primarily due to EDL trajectory dispersions caused by a modeling error in the aerodynamic lift during descend. It should be noted that the final landing site was only 7 km away from the targeted landing site.
VII. Conclusion
Exhaustive maneuver analyses and accurate propulsive maneuver design contributed to a successful landing for the Phoenix Mars Lander. The key navigation requirements pertaining to maneuver design had all been satisfied. Additionally, a new targeting strategy was developed during flight operations and successfully employed, enabling a more accurate implementation of the final approach TCMs. Six nominal, and two contingency TCMs had been planned to achieve the targeting accuracy required to achieve a safe and accurate landing. Additionally, a menu of 25 pre-designed and pre-tested maneuvers had been generated, to augment the trajectory correction capability at the TCM-6x opportunity, to recover from a potentially catastrophic off-course trajectory. However, trajectory reconstruction and control had performed with such accuracy that only 4 out of the 6 planned TCM opportunities were used. In particular, the accurate design and implementation of TCM-5, at entry -8 days, eliminated the need for implementing TCM-6, allowing the operations team to focus on the challenging task of entry, descent, and landing, contributing to an overall successful mission.
